A number of studies have recently been made on discrete distribution estimation in the local model, in which users obfuscate their personal data (e.g., location, response in a survey) by themselves and a data collector estimates a distribution of the original personal data from the obfuscated data. Unlike the centralized model, in which a trusted database administrator can access all users' personal data, the local model does not suffer from the risk of data leakage. A representative privacy metric in this model is LDP (Local Differential Privacy), which controls the amount of information leakage by a parameter called privacy budget. When is small, a large amount of noise is added to the personal data, and therefore users' privacy is strongly protected. However, when the number of users N is small (e.g., a small-scale enterprise may not be able to collect large samples) or when most users adopt a small value of , the estimation of the distribution becomes a very challenging task. The goal of this paper is to accurately estimate the distribution in the cases explained above. To achieve this goal, we focus on the EM (Expectation-Maximization) reconstruction method, which is a state-of-the-art statistical inference method, and propose a method to correct its estimation error (i.e., difference between the estimate and the true value) using the theory of Rilstone et al. We prove that the proposed method reduces the MSE (Mean Square Error) under some assumptions. We also evaluate the proposed method using three largescale datasets, two of which contain location data while the other contains census data. The results show that the proposed method significantly outperforms the EM reconstruction method in all of the datasets when N or is small.
Introduction
With the widespread use of personal computers, GPSequipped devices (e.g., mobile phones, in-car navigation systems), and IoT devices (e.g., smart meters, home monitoring devices), personal data are increasingly collected and analyzed for various purposes. For example, a great amount of location data (a.k.a. Spatial Big Data [46] ) can be analyzed to find commonly frequented public areas [51] , or can be made public to provide traffic information to users [26] . Power-consumption data from smart meters can be analyzed to extract typical daily consumption patterns in households [23] , or to identify the right customers to target for demand response programs [8] . Personal data (e.g., age, gender, income, marital satisfaction) collected via survey sampling can be used to infer the statistics (e.g., histogram, heavy hitters) of a target population.
While these data are useful for discovering knowledge or improving the quality of service, the collection of personal data can lead to a breach of users' privacy. For example, users' home/workplace pairs [18] , long-term properties (e.g., age, job position, smoking habit) [36] , and social relationship [14] can be inferred from their disclosed locations. In-home activities (e.g., presence/absence, appliance use, sleep/wake cycle) can also be inferred from power-consumption data [35] . Furthermore, various kinds of personal data from different sources can be linked and aggregated into a user profile [21, 42] , and can be provided to malicious parties.
PPDM (Privacy Preserving Data Mining) algorithms [1] have been widely studied to protect users' privacy while keeping data utility. According to their architecture, they can be divided into the following two categories: centralized model and local model (or local privacy model) [13] . In the centralized model, there is a trusted database administrator, who can access to all users' personal data. When the administrator provides the data to a data analyst (who is possibly malicious), he/she replaces user IDs with pseudonyms and obfuscates the data (e.g., by adding noise, generalization, adding dummy data). The obfuscation algorithm is designed so that the original data are not recovered from the obfuscated data (while enabling data analysis). In this model, however, the original data of all users may be leaked from the database to a malicious adversary by illegal access or internal fraud. This issue is crucial in recent years, in which the number of data leakage incidents is increasing. For example, the number of U.S. data breaches was increased by 40% in 2016 [10] .
The local model is designed to be more secure against such a data leakage. In this model, users do not assume a trusted party that can access to their personal data. The users obfuscate their personal data (e.g., add noise to the data, generalize the data) by themselves, and send them to a data collector (or data analyst). The data collector does not observe the original data, but observes only the obfuscated data. Based on the obfuscated data, he/she infers the statistics (e.g., histogram, heavy hitters [39] ) of the original data or provides a service (e.g., provides POI (point of interest) information nearby the noisy location [4] ) to the users.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of discrete distribution estimation in the local model, in which data are represented as discrete values and a data collector estimates a distribution (i.e., multinomial distribution) of the original personal data from the obfuscated data. Examples of the personal data include locations, powerconsumption data, responses in a survey, and radiation levels [43] (continuous data such as locations and powerconsumption data are discretized into bins). We refer to this problem as LPDE (Locally Private Distribution Estimation) for short. LPDE is composed of the following two phases: (1) obfuscating the personal data (i.e., obfuscation phase) and (2) estimating the discrete distribution (i.e., distribution estimation phase).
More formally, suppose that N users u 1 , · · · , u N send their obfuscated data to the data collector. Let X = {x 1 , · · · , x K } (alphabet of size K) be a space of personal data, Y = {y 1 , · · · , y L } (alphabet of size L) be a space of obfuscated data, and X n (resp. Y n ) be a random variable representing personal data (resp. obfuscated data) of u n . Each user u n (1 ≤ n ≤ N ) obfuscates his/her personal data X n via an obfuscation mechanism G, and sends the obfuscated data Y n to a data collector (in this paper, we assume that each user sends only one sample; we discuss the case where each user sends multiple samples in Section 5.4). The obfuscation mechanism G can be represented as a K × L transition matrix, whose (i, j)-th element G ij is a transition prob- ability from x i to y j :
We assume that the original data X 1 , · · · , X N are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with distribution p = (p 1 , · · · , p K ) T (we regard p as a K-dimensional vector), where p i = Pr(X = x i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ K). The data collector estimates p from the obfuscated data Y 1 , · · · , Y N with the help of the knowledge of G. Fig. 1 shows the overview of LPDE.
A number of studies have recently been made on LPDE (e.g., [3, 17, 25, 30, 31, 37, 40, 44] ), mainly from the perspective of privacy metrics, obfuscation mechanisms, and statistical inference methods. A representative privacy metric in the local model is LDP (Local Differential Privacy) [11] . LDP is a variant of differential privacy [12] in the local model, and provides privacy guarantees against adversaries with arbitrary background knowledge. Roughly speaking, LDP guarantees that the adversary cannot infer the value of the original data from the obfuscated data with a certain degree of confidence. The amount of information leakage can be bounded by a parameter called privacy budget, and a large amount of noise is added to the personal data when is small (i.e., high privacy regime). The K-RR (Kary Randomized Response) [30, 31] and the RAPPOR (Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response) [17] are examples of obfuscation mechanisms satisfying LDP.
As for statistical inference methods, the matrix inversion method [3, 25, 30] and the EM (ExpectationMaximization) reconstruction method [2, 3] (which is also called the iterative Bayesian technique [3] ) are wellknown approaches. The matrix inversion method is used when the output alphabet size L is equal to the input alphabet size K. It infers a discrete distribution p by multiplying an empirical distribution of the obfuscated data Y 1 , · · · , Y N by an inverse matrix G −1 . A major drawback of this method is that some elements in an estimatep of p can be negative, especially when the number of users N is small. The EM reconstruction method is a more sophisticated way to infer p. This method is based on the EM algorithm [22] , and iteratively estimates p until convergence. The feature of this method is that the final estimate (converged value)p is equal to the ML (Maximum Likelihood) estimate in the probability simplex (i.e.,p 1 , · · · ,p K ≥ 0,
, irrespective of the number of users N (see Section 3.2 for more details). It is reported in [3] that the EM reconstruction method significantly outperforms the matrix inversion method.
One of the main challenges in LPDE is how to accurately estimate the true discrete distribution p when the number of users N is small, or when users add a large amount of noise to their personal data (i.e., high privacy regime in which the privacy budget is small). It is well known that the ML estimate (i.e., the estimate by the EM reconstruction method) converges to the true value as the sample size goes to infinity. However, the number of users N can be small in practice due to various reasons. For example, N can be small when a data collector is a small-scale enterprise. Although Google implemented the RAPPOR in the Chrome browser and collected a dozen million samples [17] , small-scale enterprises may not be able to collect such large samples. For another example, N can be small when a data collector estimates a distribution for people at a certain place or at a certain time. Furthermore, even if N is large, the effective sample size can be small in the high privacy regime. Duchi et al. [11] showed that for ∈ [0, 22 35 ], the effective sample size required to achieve a certain level of estimation errors (minimax rate) is 4 2 N (i.e., it decreases quadratically with decrease in ). Thus, it is very challenging to accurately estimate p when is small (e.g., = 0.01 or 0.1).
Our Contributions
The goal of this paper is to accurately estimate a discrete distribution p when the number of users N or the privacy budget is small. To achieve this goal, we focus on a distribution estimation phase in LPDE. Specifically, we focus on the EM reconstruction method [2, 3] , which is a state-of-the-art statistical inference method, and propose a method to correct its estimation error (i.e., difference between the estimate and the true value) to significantly improve the estimation accuracy.
Our contributions are summarized as follows: -We propose a method to correct an estimation error of the EM reconstruction method based on the theory of Rilstone et al. [41] . A major problem here is that the estimated error value may not be accurate when N or is small. To address this issue, the proposed method multiplies the estimated error value by a weight parameter α, and automatically determines an optimal value of α. We also prove that the proposed method reduces the MSE (Mean Square Error) under some assumptions (Section 4). -We evaluate the proposed method using three largescale real datasets: the People-flow dataset [45] , the Foursquare dataset [50] , and the US Census (1990) dataset [33] . The first and second datasets contain location data, while the third dataset contains census data. The results show that the proposed method significantly outperforms the existing inference methods (i.e., the matrix inversion method [3, 25, 30] and the EM reconstruction method [2, 3] ) in all of the datasets when N or is small (Section 5).
More specifically about the second contribution, we consider the fact that the required privacy level can vary from user to user in practice [29] . Conservative users would require high level of privacy, whereas liberal users would not mind low level of privacy. Some liberal users might not mind it even if some of their personal data (e.g., visited sightseeing places, innocuous responses in a survey) are made public, and consequently they might not use an obfuscation method. Taking this into account, we evaluated the proposed method (denoted by Proposal) in a scenario where the privacy budget is different from user to user (those who do not use an obfuscation method can be modeled by setting to ∞). We also generalize the matrix inversion method (denoted by MatInv) and the EM reconstruction method (denoted by EM) to such a scenario (see Section 3.2), and evaluate these methods for comparison. The results show that Proposal outperforms MatInv and EM when the total number of users N is small (e.g., N ≈ 1000) or when N is large but most users adopt a small value of (e.g., = 0.1).
In addition to the above-mentioned methods, we also evaluate two methods that estimate p without the knowledge of the obfuscation mechanism. The first one estimates p as an empirical distribution of the obfuscated data Y 1 , · · · , Y N (denoted by ObfDat). The second one always estimates p as a uniform distribution:
In our experiments, we show that all of Proposal, MatInv, and EM performed worse than these two methods when both N and (adopted by most users) are extremely small. This is because the variance of the estimatep is very small in ObfDat and Uniform (in particular, the variance ofp is always 0 in Uniform). On the other hand, the variance ofp is very large in Proposal, MatInv, and EM when both N and are extremely small. We show this limitation, and provide a guideline for when to use the proposed method by thoroughly evaluating the effects of N and on the estimation accuracy. Table 1 shows the basic notations used in the rest of this paper. It should be noted that we denote an obfuscation mechanism of user u n by G (n) ∈ [0, 1] K×L (instead of G). This is because the privacy budget can be different from user to user, as described in Section 1.1.
Preliminaries

Notations
Each user u n (1 ≤ n ≤ N ) obfuscates his/her personal data X n via the obfuscation mechanism G (n) , and sends the obfuscated data Y n to a data collector (we discuss the case where each user sends multiple samples in Section 5.4). The (i, j)-th element of G (n) is a transition probability from
We denote a set of all original data {X 1 , · · · , X N } and a set of all obfuscated data {Y 1 , · · · , Y N } by X and Y, respectively. The data collector estimates p from Y with the help of the knowledge of G (1) , · · · , G (N ) . We denote the esti-
We also denote the probability simplex by C; i.e.,
. Moreover, we define the following K-dimensional vector:
where
. g n will be used in Sections 3.2 and 4.
Utility Metrics
In this paper, we use the MSE (Mean Square Error) and the JS (Jensen-Shannon) divergence [34] as utility metrics to measure the difference between the true distribution p and its estimatep.
MSE (Mean Square Error).
The MSE is one of the most popular metrics to measure the quality of an Table 1 . Basic notations used in this paper (1 ≤ n ≤ N ). 
Symbol Description
R
index of the alphabet in Y equal to Y n (i.e., if Y n = y j , then π(Y n ) = j).
estimator. Given p andp, the squared error (i.e., l 2 loss) is computed as follows:
It should be noted that the original data X are randomly generated from p, and the obfuscated data Y are randomly generated from X using the obfuscation mechanisms G (1) , · · · , G (N ) . Sincep is computed from Y, the squared error can be changed depending on Y.
The MSE is an expectation of the squared error:
(or the sample mean of the squared errors over multiple realizations of Y). Based on the bias-variance decomposition [22] , it can be decomposed as follows:
Fig . 2 shows the relationship between the MSE, bias, and variance. Note that the bias and variance are highly dependent on inference methods. For example, when we always estimate p as p = (
e., Uniform), the variance is always 0 (i.e., Var(p) = 0). When we use the EM reconstruction method, the bias is much smaller (as shown in our experiments) and the variance is larger than 0. JS (Jensen-Shannon) divergence. Since the JS divergence [34] is related to the KL (Kullback-Leibler) divergence [9] , we first explain the KL divergence. The KL divergence between p andp is given by
Although the KL divergence can also measure the difference between p andp, it becomes infinite when p i > 0
To avoid this problem, we use the JS divergence. The JS divergence between p andp is given by
where m = (p +p)/2. In contrast to the KL divergence, the JS divergence is always finite. It can be seen from (2) and (3) that the errors in small values of p has a small impact on the MSE. On the other hand, the errors in small values of p can make a large impact on the JS divergence (due to the logarithm in (7)). Thus, the MSE is suitable for evaluating the errors in large values of p, whereas the JS divergence is suitable for evaluating the errors in small values of p.
Privacy Metrics
In this paper, we use LDP (Local Differential Privacy) [11] as a privacy metric in the local model:
Definition 1 ( -LDP [11] ). An obfuscation mechanism G (n) provides -LDP ( -local differential privacy) if for all i, j ∈ {1, · · · , K} and all S ⊂ Y, we have
LDP guarantees that an adversary who obtains obfuscated data Y n cannot infer, for any pair of x i and x j , whether X n = x i or X n = x j with a certain degree of confidence. When is close to 0, it seems for the adversary that all of x 1 , · · · , x K ∈ X are almost equally likely. Therefore, LDP with a small value of guarantees strong privacy protection.
Related Work
We now review the previous work related to ours. We describe obfuscation mechanisms and statistical inference methods in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
Obfuscation Mechanisms
Obfuscation mechanisms that satisfy LDP have been widely studied in recent years. The K-RR (K-ary Randomized Response) [30, 31] is one of the simplest mechanisms satisfying LDP. This mechanism is a generalization of Warner's binary randomized response [49] to K-ary alphabets.
In the K-RR, the output range is identical to the input domain; i.e.,
Another example is the RAPPOR (Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response) [17] , which is used in the Chrome browser. The simplest configuration of the RAPPOR is called the basic one-time RAPPOR. The basic one-time RAPPOR is a mechanism with the output alphabet Y = {0, 1} K of size 2 K . Specifically, it deterministically maps x i (1 ≤ i ≤ K) onto e i ∈ {0, 1} K , where e i is the i-th standard basis vector. Then it flips each bit of e i with probability 1/(1 + e /2 ). This mechanism also satisfies -LDP.
Kairouz et al. [30, 31] theoretically analyzed the K-RR and the basic one-time RAPPOR. In [30] , they proved that under l 1 and l 2 losses, the K-RR and the basic one-time RAPPOR are order optimal in the low privacy regime (e.g., = ln(K)) and high privacy regime (e.g., = 0.01, 0.1), respectively. In [31] , they also proved that the K-RR is optimal in that it maximizes the mutual information I(X; Y ) between the original data X and the obfuscated data Y in the low privacy regime.
Other promising obfuscation mechanisms have also been studied in the literature. Kairouz et al. [30] pro-posed the O-RR, which is an extension of the K-RR using hash functions and cohorts. They showed that the performance of the O-RR meets or exceeds that of K-RR and the basic one-time RAPPOR in both low and high privacy regimes. Sei et al. [44] proposed an extension of the K-RR that not only randomizes the data but also adds multiple dummy samples. They showed that it outperforms the K-RR for ∈ [0.1, 1] using several artificial datasets.
In this paper, we use the K-RR as an obfuscation mechanism satisfying LDP due to the following reasons: (1) it is simple and widely used; (2) the output alphabet size L is small (not 2 K but K); (3) it can provide the optimal data utility in the low privacy regime [30, 31] .
Statistical Inference Methods
The data collector computes an estimatep
The matrix inversion method [3, 25, 30] and the EM reconstruction method [2, 3] are existing methods to computep from Y. Although both of them assume that all users
, we generalize these methods to the case where G (1) , · · · , G (N ) can be different, as we describe in detail below.
Matrix Inversion Method.
Assume that the output alphabet size L is equal to the input alphabet size K, and that all users use the same obfus-
The matrix inversion method computesp by multiplyingq by an inverse matrix G −1
As the number of users N goes to infinity, the empirical distributionq converges to the true distribution q. Therefore,p also converges to the true distribution p.
We generalize the matrix inversion method to the case where there are multiple obfuscation mechanisms
and each user chooses one of the mechanisms to obfuscate his/her data (e.g., each user chooses one mechanism out of G 1 , G 2 , and G 3 , each of which is corresponding to the high, middle, and low privacy regime, respectively).
K be an empirical distribution of the obfuscated data generated using G m . Then,p can be computed as follows:
As N 1 , · · · , N M go to infinity,p converges to p (in the same way as the original matrix inversion method). However, when the number of users N (= M m=1 N m ) is small, many elements inp can be negative. Kairouz et al. [30] considered two methods to constrainp to the probability simplex C. The first method is a normalized decoder, which truncates the negative elements ofp to 0 and renormalizesp so that the sum is 1. The second method is a projected decoder, which projectsp onto the probability simplex C so that the Euclidean distance between the two points is minimized (using the algorithm in [48] ). We evaluate both methods in Section 5.
EM reconstruction Method.
The EM reconstruction method is a more sophisticated method to infer p. It regards X as a latent variable (or hidden variable), and infers p from Y using the EM (ExpectationMaximization) algorithm [22] , which guarantees that the log-likelihood function L Y (p) := log Pr(Y|p) is increased at each iteration (EM cycle). Although this method assumes that mechanisms G (1) , · · · , G (N ) are the same [2, 3] , we describe this method in a general case where
Specifically, the following algorithm is equivalent to the EM algorithm (we can show this equivalence in the same way as [2] ; we omit the proof for lack of space):
Repeat the update by (14) until convergence.
The feature of the EM reconstruction method is that the final estimate (converged value)p is equal to the ML (Maximum Likelihood) estimate in the probability simplex C, irrespective of the number of users N .
This can be explained as follows. The ML estimate in the probability simplex C maximizes the log-likelihood function L Y (p) (= log Pr(Y|p)) over C. Since all of the obfuscated data
= log p T g n ). log p T g n is strictly concave in p, and the sum of strictly concave functions is strictly concave. (15) is strictly concave, and has a unique global maximum over C. It follows from (14) that the estimate of the EM reconstruction method is always in C.
In addition, each EM cycle in the EM algorithm is guaranteed to increase L Y (p) [22] . Therefore, the estimate of the EM reconstruction method converges to the ML estimate in C, whose log-likelihood is the global maximum over C.
Note that this property holds irrespective of the number of users N . When N is small, many elements ofp can be negative in the matrix inversion method. On the other hand, the elements ofp are always nonnegative in the EM reconstruction method, since it is equal to the ML estimate in C. Thus, the EM reconstruction method can significantly outperform the matrix inversion method [3] . We also show this in Section 5.
Estimation Error Correction of the EM Reconstruction Method
The EM reconstruction method is a state-of-the-art statistical inference method, whose estimate is equal to the ML estimate in C, irrespective of the number of users N . However, even this method may not accurately estimate the distribution p when N or is small, since the estimation error increases with decrease in N and .
To address this issue, we propose a method to reduce an estimation error (i.e., difference between the estimatep and the true value p) of the EM reconstruction method. Here we briefly describe its outline. We first formalize the expectation of the estimation error E[p]−p (i.e., bias) in the EM reconstruction method up to order O(N −1 ), which is denoted by a −1 ∈ R K , based on the theory of Rilstone et al. [41] . We then replace the expectation E in a −1 with the empirical mean over N samples We also prove that, under some assumptions, the MSE of the EM reconstruction method is reduced by subtractingâ −1 fromp (Proposition 1 in Section 4.4). Note that this correction method was used to reduce the bias of the estimate [5, 41] . However, we prove a more general result that applying this correction can lead to a reduction in the MSE.
The proposed method computesâ −1 as an estimate ofp−p, and subtracts it fromp. However,â −1 may not be accurately computed when N or is small. Thus, the proposed method multipliesâ −1 by a weight parameter α and automatically determines an optimal value of α.
We first describe the theory of Rilstone et al. in Section 4.1. We then describe the proposed algorithm in Section 4.2, and describe how to determine an optimal value of α in Section 4.3. We finally provide a theoretical analysis of the MSE in Section 4.4. [41] considered an estimatep ∈ R K that is written as a solution to the following estimation equation:
Theory of Rilstone et al.
Given a set of
where s n : R K → R K is a function that takesp as input and outputs a K-dimensional vector based on the n-th sample Y n . The expectation of s n is 0 only at the true value p: E[s n (p)] = 0. The class of estimators characterized by (16) include the ML estimator, generalized method of moments (GMM), and least squares (LS). Rilstone et al. [41] showed that E[p]−p (i.e., bias) of the estimate that satisfies (16) can be written as follows:
a −1 ∈ R K is a dominant bias term of order O(N −1 ), which is called the second-order bias 1 , and is given by
1 Note that the first-order bias, which is a bias term of order
where s n is a shorthand for s n (p), ∇ is a vector differential operator (i.e., ∇ =
, ⊗ is a tensor product, and
Proposed Algorithm
We now describe the proposed method. We first exploit the fact that the estimate of the EM reconstruction method is equal to the ML estimate (as described in Section 3.2), and apply the theory of Rilstone et al. to the EM reconstruction method. Specifically, we exploit the fact that maximizing the (15) is equivalent to solving the following equation:
(i.e., the gradient of the log-likelihood function ∇L n is 0). By regarding ∇L n in (21) as s n in (16), we can apply the theory of Rilstone et al. to the EM reconstruction method. Since L n (p) = log p T g n (see (15) ), s n (= ∇L n ), ∇s n , and ∇ 2 s n are written as follows:
By using (23) , Q in (19) and V n in (20) are written as follows:
(27)
is the Fisher information matrix [9] . Since −Q is the inverse of this matrix, it provides the lower bound of covariance matrix (i.e., Crámer-Rao inequality [9] ). The second-order bias a −1 in the EM reconstruction method is given by substituting (22) , (24), (25) , and (27) into (18) . We replace the expectation E in a −1 with the empirical mean over N samples Y 1 , · · · , Y N . Since we do not know the true value p, we also replace p with the estimatep (i.e., plug-in estimate), as done in [5, 41] . The result value, denoted byâ −1 , can be written as follows:
(E in a −1 , Q, and V n is now replaced by the empirical mean inâ −1 ,Q, andV n , respectively). We emphasize again that bothâ −1 andp are computed based on the
However, there is a major problem in computingQ in (29) . When N or is small, the rank ofŜ in (31) becomes much smaller than K (note that as goes to 0, g n g T n in (29) approaches to (1/K 2 )J K , where J K is the K × K all-ones matrix whose rank is 1). WhenŜ is highly rank deficient, we cannot computeQ in (29) , which is the inverse of −Ŝ.
To avoid this problem, we add a small positive value λ (> 0) to the diagonal elements ofŜ to makeŜ a full rank matrix. Such a regularization is known as the Tikhonov regularization [20] . That is, we computeQ as follows:Q
where I K is the K × K identity matrix. We computeâ −1 fromp and g n (1 ≤ n ≤ N ) by substituting (30) , (31) , and (32) into (28) (we can computeâ −1 with time complexity O(N K 2 ); for details, see Appendix B). It should be noted, however, thatQ in (32) may not be accurately computed, since the matrix λI K is added toŜ in (32) . As a consequence,â −1 may also not be accurately computed. To address this issue, we multiplyâ −1 by a weight parameter α (> 0). In other words, we do not trustâ −1 itself, but trust the direction ofâ −1 . We denote the corrected estimate in the proposed method byp = (p 1 , · · · ,p K ) T ∈ R K ; i.e., p =p−αâ −1 . We describe how to determine an optimal value of α in Section 4.3. In summary, the proposed algorithm is as follows:
Algorithm 2 (Proposed Algorithm
by (30)- (32) (see Appendix B for details). 3. Correct the estimation error ofp as follows:
(see Section 4.3 for optimization of α). Fig. 3 shows the corrected estimatep in the proposed method. Note that the corrected estimatep in (33) can deviate from the probability simplex C slightly (this deviation is very small if αâ −1 are appropriate). Thus, after the step 3 in Algorithm 2, we use the normalized decoder, which is described in Section 3.2, to constraiñ p to the probability simplex C.
Optimization of the Weight Parameter
We now describe how to determine an optimal value of the weight parameter α (> 0) in the proposed method. The proposed method determines α by running a simulation that simulates a real distribution estimation task using some distribution p = (p 1 , · · · , p K ) T (we use a symbol with " " to represent a variable in the simulation; we describe what to use as p later in detail). Fig. 4 shows the overview of determining α based on the simulation. We first generate personal data X = {X 1 , · · · , X N } from the distribution p (X 1 , · · · , X N are i.i.d. with p ). Then we obfuscate the n-th personal data X n using the n-th obfuscation mechanism G (n) (1 ≤ n ≤ N ). Let Y = {Y 1 , · · · , Y N } be the obfuscated data generated from X . We compute a corrected estimatẽ p = (p 1 , · · · ,p K ) T in the proposed method from Y by running Algorithm 2 for various values of α (e.g., α ∈ {10 −10 , 10 −9 , · · · , 1}). We evaluate the estimation error ofp (e.g., squared error ||p − p || 2 2 ) for each value of α, and select α that achieves the smallest error.
Select α with the smallest error Simulation using a distribution p′ Fig. 4 . Overview of determining the weight parameter α. We run a simulation using a distribution p , and compute a corrected estimatep in the proposed method for various values of α (e.g., α ∈ {10 −10 , 10 −9 , · · · , 1}). Then we select α that achieves the smallest estimation error.
Note that after running the steps 1 and 2 in Algorithm 2, we can computep for each value of α by just running the step 3 in Algorithm 2 (i.e., we run the steps 1 and 2 in Algorithm 2 just for once, and then run the step 3 for many times). Therefore, the time complexity of determining α is O(N K 2 ) (i.e., the same as Algorithm 2) in total.
We now describe what to use as p in the simulation. When no prior information is available about the true distribution p, we should use a uniform distribution as p . It should be noted, however, that the obfuscated data Y are available as prior information about p. Taking this into account, we use the empirical distribution of Y as p . In our experiments, we also confirmed that the proposed method that determines α using the empirical distribution of Y provided the better performance than the proposed method that determines α using the uniform distribution.
Remark. It should be noted that although we start with the formalization of the second-order bias a −1 in the EM reconstruction method, the proposed method does not guarantee that the bias of the EM reconstruction method is reduced. In fact, the bias of the proposed method was larger than that of the EM reconstruction method in our experiments (as shown in Appendix C). We consider this is because we applied the Tikhonov regularization to computeQ in (32) . A regularization method is generally used to significantly reduce the variance by introducing a bias in the estimate. The Tikhonov regularization can also introduce a bias [28] .
However, we emphasize that the goal of this paper is to accurately estimate p when N or is small, and that we utilizeâ −1 as a means to reduce the estimation error. In our experiments, we show that it significantly reduces the variance (at the cost of increasing the bias), and therefore reduces the MSE and the JS divergence. We also prove that the proposed method reduces the MSE under some assumptions in Section 4.4.
It should also be noted that the weight parameter α can influence the estimation accuracy. In this paper, we generate artificial data from the empirical distribution of Y in an analogous way to the parametric bootstrap method [15] , and chooses a hyper-parameter α (i.e., performs a kind of model selection) using the artificial data. It is also known that the bootstrap method is used for model selection [27] . However, we may be able to choose a better α by improving our method in several directions. For example, although we choose α that minimizes the squared error ||p − p || 2 2 based on one simulation in our experiments, we may be able to choose a better α by running multiple simulations and using the MSE as a metric (at the cost of computational time necessary to optimize α). We may also be able to choose a better α by extending our method to the Bayesian framework in the same way as [19] . We leave such improvements as future work.
Theoretical Analysis
We provide a theoretical analysis of the MSE in the proposed method. Specifically, we show that the proposed method can reduce the second-order MSE, which is an MSE term of order O(N −3/2 ), to zero under some assumptions.
According to the theory of Rilstone et al. [41] , the MSE of the EM reconstruction method (denoted by MSE EM ) can be written as follows 2 :
2 Note that in [41] , the MSE is represented in the form of a matrix (i.e., error covariance matrix). MSE EM can be written as (34) by computing the trace of the MSE matrix in [41] .
b −1 is a term of order O(N −1 ), and is called the firstorder MSE. b −3/2 is a term of order O(N −3/2 ), and is called the second-order MSE. We now consider the proposed method with the weight parameter α = 1, which corrects the estimatê p of the EM reconstruction method by subtractingâ −1 in (28) fromp:p
Let MSE Proposal be the MSE of this method. To simplify our theoretical analysis, we assume the following two assumptions: (i)â −1 is evaluated at p, (ii) Q, V n , and E[∇ 2 s n ] are perfectly estimated: Q =Q, V n =V n , and
In this case, a −1 in (28) can be written as follows:
It should be noted that although we make some ideal assumptions, we still replace the two expectation terms E in a −1 (see (18) ) with the empirical mean over N samples Y 1 , · · · , Y N . We prove that the second-order MSE is reduced to zero by these replacements. Namely, we prove the following result: Proposition 1.
The proof is given in Appendix A. Proposition 1 indicates that the estimation error can be reduced by subtractingâ −1 fromp (sinceâ −1 may not be accurately computed, we multiplyâ −1 by α in practice). It should be noted, however, that the first-order MSE b −1 is not reduced in this case. This can be explained by the fact that Proposal provides almost the same performance as EM when N is large in our experiments. However, we emphasize that it is still beneficial to reduce b −3/2 when N is small, since the term of order O(N −3/2 ) is large in this case. In fact, Proposal significantly outperforms EM when N or is small, as shown in our experiments.
Experimental Evaluation
Experimental Set-up
We evaluated the proposed method by conducting experiments using three real datasets: the People-flow dataset [45] , the Foursquare dataset [50] , and the US Census (1990) dataset [33] . The first two datasets contain location data, while the third dataset contains census data. We used these datasets because they are largescale datasets (we used the data of 303916, 251689, and 2458285 people in the People-flow, Foursquare, and US Census datasets, respectively). In the following, we describe these datasets in detail: -People-flow dataset: The People-flow dataset (1998 Tokyo metropolitan area) [45] contains mobility traces (time-series location trails) of 722000 people in the Tokyo metropolitan area in 1998. In this paper, we used this dataset for estimating a geographic population distribution in the period of one day. To this end, we extracted mobility traces of 303916 people on the first of October, and used the first location sample for each user (we excluded the remaining 418084 people since they had no location samples on the first of October). We divided the Tokyo metropolitan area into 20×20 regions, excluded 119 regions in the sea, and used the remaining 281 land regions as input alphabets (K = 281). -Foursquare dataset: The Foursquare dataset (global-scale check-in dataset) [50] was collected from April 2012 to September 2013. It contains location check-ins by 266909 people all over the world. Since many of these check-ins were located in 415 cities, we focused on these cities. We extracted 251689 people who had at least one check-in in these cities, and used the first location check-in for each user (we excluded the remaining 15220 people who had no check-ins in these cities). We used the 415 cities as input alphabets (K = 415). -US Census (1990) dataset: The US Census (1990) dataset [33] was collected as part of US census in 1990. It contains responses from 2458285 people (each user provided one response), where each response has 68 attributes. We used the responses from all people, and used age, sex, income, and marital status as attributes. Each attribute has 8, 2, 5, and 5 category IDs depending on their value, as shown in Table 2 . We regarded a sequence of these category IDs as a single category ID. Thus, the total number of category IDs is 400 (= 8 × 2 × 5 × 5). We used these category IDs as input alphabets (K = 400).
For each dataset, we used a frequency distribution of all people (303916, 251689, and 2458285 people in the People-flow, Foursquare, and US Census datasets, respectively) as p (i.e., distribution of the original data). We randomly selected N users from these people. Here we attempted 100 cases to randomly select N users, and ran, for each case, the following experiments. We conducted experiments, in which each user u n (1 ≤ n ≤ N ) obfuscates his/her personal data X n (i.e., region ID, city ID, or category ID) via the obfuscation mechanism G (n) , and a data collector computes an estimatep of the distribution p based on the obfuscated data Y = {Y 1 , · · · , Y N }. As an obfuscation mechanism G (n) , we used the K-RR (i.e., G KRR in (10)). As for the privacy budget , we considered four values: = 0.1, 2, ln(K), and ∞, each of which is corresponding to the high, middle, low, and "no" privacy regime, respectively. We denote the number of users who set = 0.1, 2, ln(K), and ∞ by N 1 , N 2 , N 3 , and N 4 , respectively (i.e., N = 4 i=1 N i ). We set = 0.1 and 2 in the high and middle privacy regime, respectively, since many studies used these values [24] and = 0.1 offers reasonably strong privacy protection [32] . We set = ln(K) in the low privacy regime, since a user sends different data (i.e., X n = Y n ) with probability 50% even in this case. In other words, = ln(K) can still provide plausible deniability. This value of was also used in [30] . When = ∞, G KRR in (10) is equivalent to the identity matrix I K . This means that those who do not use an obfuscation method can be modeled by setting to ∞, as described in Section 1.1.
However, many users might care about their privacy and prefer the high or middle privacy regime (i.e., = 0.1 or 2). Taking this into account, we set N 3 and N 4 much smaller than N 1 and N 2 . Specifically, we first set N 1 , N 2 , N 3 , and N 4 so that N 1 : N 2 : N 3 = 10 : 10 : 1 and changed N 4 from 0 to N 3 (e.g., (N 1 , N 2 , N 3 ) = (500, 500, 50) and N 4 ∈ [0, 50]). We then evaluated the performance in the case where we significantly increased only N 1 (i.e., most users select the high privacy regime in which = 0.1). To more thoroughly evaluate the effects of N and on the performance, we also set N 1 = N 4 = 0 and evaluated the performance for various values of N 2 and N 3 .
As a statistical inference method, we evaluated the following methods for comparison: -Uniform: A method that always estimates p as a uniform distribution:p = (
The matrix inversion method using the normalized decoder (described in Section 3.2). -MatInv proj : The matrix inversion method using the projected decoder (described in Section 3.2). -EM: The EM reconstruction method (described in Section 3.2). -Proposal: The proposed method.
In EM, we used the empirical distribution of Y as an initial value ofp (i.e.,p ←q) in the same way as [3] . In Proposal, we set λ = 10 −3 , and attempted various values for α: α ∈ {c 1 × 10 c2 |c 1 ∈ {1, · · · , 9}, c 2 ∈ {−1, · · · , −10}}. Then we selected α that achieved the smallest squared error (i.e., ||p − p || 2 2 ). After computing the estimatep (or the corrected estimatep in Proposal), we evaluated the MSE and the JS divergence. Specifically, we computed the average of the squared error ||p − p|| 2 2 (or ||p − p|| 2 2 ) over 100 runs (i.e., 100 cases to randomly select N users), and used it as the MSE. In other words, we computed the sample mean of 100 squared errors as the MSE. Similarly, we averaged the JS divergence over 100 runs. We also evaluated, for both the squared error and the JS divergence, the standard deviation over 100 runs.
Experimental Results
We first evaluated the MSE and the JS divergence in the case where (N 1 , N 2 , N 3 ) = (500, 500, 50) and N 4 ∈ [0, 50]. Fig. 5 shows the results.
It can be seen that the MSE and the JS divergence of MatInv norm and MatInv proj are very large. This is because many elements in the estimatep were negative, as described in Section 3.2. In particular, the performance of MatInv proj is much worse than that of the other inference methods. This is because the estimatep -flow dataset ((N 1 , N 2 , N 3 ) = (500, 500, 50) dataset ((N 1 , N 2 , N 3 ) = (500, 500, 50 that contained many negative elements was projected to a vertex of the probability simplex (i.e., each element inp was either 0 or 1). On the other hand, EM outperforms MatInv norm and MatInv proj in most cases (in the same way as [3] ), since the elements inp are always nonnegative, as described in Section 3.2.
It can also be seen that Proposal outperforms EM, which shows that the estimation accuracy is improved by correcting the estimation error (although the error bars overlap in many cases, we show later that there is a very high correlation between 100 squared errors of Proposal and those of EM). In particular, Proposal significantly outperforms EM when N 4 is small. This is because the estimation error of EM is large in this case and is corrected by Proposal.
However, when N 4 is small, Uniform or ObfDat provides the best performance in some cases (e.g., the MSE in the People-flow dataset, the JS divergence in the Foursquare dataset). This is because the variance of the estimatep was very small in Uniform and ObfDat (in Appendix C, we also show the results of the bias and variance for each method; see Appendix C for details). More specifically, the variance ofp was always 0 in Uniform, as described in Section 2.2. The variance ofp was also close to 0 in ObfDat, since only a small number of people sent the original data X n (i.e., X n = Y n ). In other words, the empirical distribution of the obfuscated data Y 1 , · · · , Y N was close to the uniform distribution. If the variance is larger than the bias of these methods, the MSE is also larger.
To investigate the relationship between the total number of users N (= Fig. 6 shows the results. It can be seen that when N is very small, the MSE of Uni- -flow dataset ((N 1 , N 2 , N 3 ) = (20000, 500, 50 dataset ((N 1 , N 2 , N 3 ) = (20000, 500, 50 form or ObfDat is the smallest in all of the datasets. It can also be seen that the MSE and the JS divergence of Proposal rapidly decrease as N increases. Proposal provides the best performance with respect to both the MSE and the JS divergence when N is more than or equal to 660, 1320, and 440 in the People-flow, Foursquare, and US Census datasets, respectively.
We also evaluated the performance in the case where we significantly increased only N 1 (i.e., the number of users with = 0.1). Specifically, we set (N 1 , N 2 , N 3 ) = (20000, 500, 50) and N 4 ∈ [0, 50]. Fig. 7 shows the results. Fig. 7 is very similar to Fig. 5 , and the MSE and the JS divergence are only slightly decreased (or not decreased) by increasing N 1 . This is because when = 0.1, the probability of sending the original data X n (i.e., X n = Y n ) was very small (0.39%, 0.27%, and 0.28%, in the People-flow, Foursquare, and US Census datasets, respectively). Since these users sent different data (i.e., X n = Y n ) in most cases, they did not contribute much to the estimation accuracy. This is consistent with the fact that the effective sample size decreases quadratically with decrease in [11] . To more thoroughly evaluate the effects of N and on the performance, we finally set N 1 = N 4 = 0 and evaluated 100 squared errors and the MSE for various values of N 2 and N 3 (we do not show the JS divergence for lack of space). Fig. 8 shows the box plots of 100 squared errors for EM and Proposal. We also computed the correlation coefficient r between 100 squared errors of Proposal and those of EM, and the p-value p of the t-test for paired samples. Fig. 9 shows the results. In addition, Fig. 10 shows the best inference method, which achieves the smallest MSE among the six methods, for each case.
It can be seen from Fig. 8 that Proposal significantly outperforms EM when N 3 is small. This is because the estimation error of EM is large in this case and is corrected by Proposal. It can also be seen from Fig. 9 that the correlation coefficient r is very close to one in most cases. This means that when the MSE of Proposal is smaller than that of EM, Proposal outperforms EM in almost all of the 100 runs. Consequently, the difference between 100 squared errors of Proposal and those of EM is statistically significant (p < 0.05).
However, it can be seen from Fig. 10 that Uniform or ObfDat provides the best performance when N 2 and N 3 are very small (e.g., N 3 = 0). This is because the variance of the estimatep was very small in Uniform and ObfDat, as previously explained. In addition, Proposal provides almost the same performance as EM when N 2 and N 3 are large. From Fig. 8 and 10 , we conclude that Proposal is effective especially when N 3 is about 100 to 200 in the People-flow dataset, about 100 to 200 in the Foursquare dataset, and about 30 to 60 in the US Census dataset.
Visualization of Distributions
In Section 5.2, Proposal significantly outperformed EM in the case where the number of users N was small or when most users adopted a small value of . To explain how the proposed method corrected the estimation error in the EM reconstruction method, we visualize the true distribution p, the estimatep in EM, and the corrected estimatep in Proposal using the People-flow dataset. Fig. 11 shows the true distribution p. Fig. 12 showŝ p andp in the special wards of Tokyo in the case where (N 1 , N 2 , N 3 , N 4 ) = (500, 500, 50, 20) . In Fig. 12 , we show 100 values of the estimates in each of the fifteen regions (from upper left to lower right) as a box plot.
It can be seen that a variance of is smaller in Proposal in all of the regions. The maximum value ofp i in EM is much larger than the true value. EM also estimatesp i to be very close to zero in many cases (e.g., Regions #1, #3, #4, and #15). Proposal corrects these over/underestimated values. We consider this is the reason Proposal significantly outperformed EM.
Discussions on the Case of Multiple Samples Per User
In our experiments, we assumed that each user sends only one sample, and the data collector estimates the distribution p. We finally discuss the extension of our results to case where each user sends multiple samples. For example, suppose that user u n obfuscates t samples X (1) n , · · · , X (t) n using the obfuscation mechanism G (n) , which satisfies -LDP, and sends the obfuscated samples Y (1) n , · · · , Y (t) n to the data collector. Then, it follows from by the composition theorem [13] that the t samples are protected by ( t)-LDP. Therefore, if user u n wants to protect t samples by -LDP, he/she can satisfy this privacy requirement by using, for each sample, the obfuscation mechanism satisfying ( /t)-LDP.
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Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a method to correct an estimation error of the EM reconstruction method. The experimental results using three large-scale real datasets showed that the proposed method significantly outperforms the existing inference methods when N is small or when most users adopt a small value of .
In this paper, we used LDP as a privacy metric, and showed the effectiveness of the proposed method using two location datasets (and one census dataset). In the field of location privacy, a privacy metric called geo-indistiguishability [4, 6, 7, 16] is also widely studied. Geo-indistiguishability can be regarded as a variant of LDP that multiplies in (9) by the distance (e.g., Euclidean distance) between x i and x j . It allows the adversary to infer approximate information about the original location (e.g., the fact that the user is in Paris), but does not allow him/her to infer the exact location (e.g., exact home address). By relaxing the privacy requirements in this way, the amount of noise added to the location data can be significantly reduced, and consequently the distribution estimation error (e.g., MSE, JS divergence) can be significantly reduced. As future work, we would like to evaluate the proposed method using geo-indistiguishability as a privacy metric.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 1 in Section 4.4. The difference between the estimatep of the EM reconstruction method and the true value p can be written as follows (see Lemma 3.1 in [41] ):
By using (37), (38) , (40), and (42), the difference between the estimate of the proposed method (i.e.,p − a −1 ) and the true value p can be written as follows:
We note here that d, c 1 , and c 2 are terms of order
, and O(N −1 ), respectively. This can be explained as follows. Since E[s n ] = 0 (as described in Section 4.1), the expectation of d n in (38) is also 0: (37) is a term of order O(N −1/2 ) (due to the central limit theorem [47] ). In addition, it follows from (20) that E[V n ] = 0. Then, since both ( (43) is obtained by subtractinĝ a −1 from the right-hand side of (42)).
Thus, MSE Proposal can be written, using (35) and (43) , as follows:
In the following, we show that both E[d T c 1 ] and
, which can be written, using (37) and (44), as follows:
As previously described,
N are independent, and V 1 , · · · , V N are also independent. Using these facts, we have
By (49) and (50), we have
We can show that
can be written, using (37) and (45) , as follows:
where A · B (A, B ∈ R K×K×K ) represents the tensor contraction of A and B as follows: 
By (52) and (54), we have
By (48), (51) , and (55), the equation (41) holds.
It should be noted that we can immediately derive from (43) 
B Computation ofâ −1 in the Proposed Method
Here we describe how to computeâ −1 in (28) fromp and g n (1 ≤ n ≤ N ) by using (30) , (31) , and (32) with time complexity O(N K 2 ). We begin by explaining the first term of (28):
V n ∈ R K×K ,Q ∈ R K×K , and s n ∈ R K are computed fromp and g n (see (22) , (30) , (31) , and (32)). A straightforward computation of (56) requires time complexity of O(N K 3 ), since the multiplication ofV n ∈ R K×K andQ ∈ R K×K requires time complexity of O(K 3 ). However, we can compute (56) with time complexity O(N K 2 ) by transformingV nQ s n as follows:
We can compute the multiplication of s T n ∈ R K bŷ Q T ∈ R K×K with time complexity O(K 2 ). Similarly, we can compute the multiplication of s T nQ T ∈ R K bŷ V T n ∈ R K×K with time complexity O(K 2 ). Thus, we can compute (57) with time complexity O(K 2 ), and (56) with time complexity O(N K 2 ).
We then explain the second term of (28) , which is more complicated:
C Analysis of the Bias and the Variance in Our Experiments
In this appendix, we decompose the MSE in Fig. 5, 6 , and 7 into the bias and variance, and show the results of the bias and variance. Fig. 13, 14, and 15 show the empirical bias and sample variance corresponding to Fig. 5, 6 , and 7, respectively. The empirical bias and sample variance were computed by replacing the expectation E in (5) and (6) with the empirical mean over N samples Y 1 , · · · , Y N . It can be seen that the variance of the estimatep is 0 in Uniform, and is close to 0 in ObfDat, as described in Section 5.2. This is the reason Uniform or ObfDat provided the best performance when N is very small.
It can also be seen that the bias of Proposal is larger than that of EM. We consider this is because we applied the Tikhonov regularization to computeQ in (32), as described in Section 4.2. However, Proposal significantly reduces the variance, and therefore reduces the MSE and the JS divergence in Fig. 13, 14 , and 15. We consider this is becauseâ can be used as a rough approximation ofp − p, as described in Section 4.2. This result is also consistent with Proposition 1, which states that the MSE is reduced (especially when N is small) by subtractingâ fromp.
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